INTRODUCTION
The Inter-American System (lAS) has three main instruments related to economic social, and cultural (ESC) rights: the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (the Declaration), 1 the American Convention on Human Rights (the Convention or ACHR), 2 and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on I Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga approach ' 9 Critics to this approach counter by arguing that Article 26 ACHR does not recognise individual, immediately justiciable rights, and Article 19(6) PSS, in conjunction with the terms of the Convention, 'leads to the conclusion that the American States drafting those two instruments did not intend to authorise the Court to adjudicate petitions alleging ESC rights abuse through article 26'. 10 The case-law of the Court regarding Article 26 ACHR has not been consistent over the years, l1 and until recently no State Party has challenged the jurisdiction of the Court regarding ESC rights claims under Article 26 ACHR. The situation changed in the case Acevedo- Buendfa et al. v. Peru.l Journal, Vol. 39, 2004, pp. 101-168 ; Ventura-Robles, M.E., 'Jurisprudencia de la Corte lnteramericana de Derechos Humanos en materia de derechos econ6micos, sociales y culturales' [Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights], Inter-American Institute of Human Rights Journal, Vol. 40, 2005, pp. 87-131) ; and the reparation approach, which understands ESC rights as enforceable through the implementation of reparation measures ordered by the Court in contentious cases {Aguilar-Cavallo, loc.cit. note 8; Feria-Tinta, M., 'Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions ', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, 2007, pp. 431-459) .
Cavallaro, J. L. and Schaffer, E., 'Rejoinder: Justice before Justiciability: Inter-American Litigation and Social Change', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 39, 2006-200"pp.345-383,at362 . Burgorgue-Larsen, loc.cit. note 9; Krsticevic, V., 'La tutela de los derechos sociales en el Sistema Interamericano' [The Protection of Social Rights in the Inter-American SystemJ, in: Ely Yamin, A. (ed.) , Los derechos econ6micos, sociales y culturales en America Latina [Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Latin-America] , APRODEH, Mexico, 2006, pp. 171-191. IACtHR, Acevedo Buendia et al. ("Discharged and Retired 
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The Americon Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador I the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae concerning the_ applicants' claims under this provision, pointing out that the Court lacked competence in matters concerning the alleged violation to the right to social security, since this right is not enshrined in the Convention and it is not even one of the two rights that would be actionable before the lAS in accordance with Article 19(6) PSS. The Court asserted that the broad wording of the Convention indicates that according to Article 62(1) ACHR 13 it has full jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to its articles and provisions. The Court ignored completely the Protocol, focusing only on the Convention. This article questions the Court's decision. It argues that the Protocol should not be ignored. Every interpretation and application of ESC rights in the lAS must take into account both treaties, the Convention and the ProtocoJ.l 4 Otherwise the analysis would he incomplete and will definitely contradict the State Parties' consent, undermining the legitimacy of the Commission or the Court.
The analysis will be divided in five sections. Section 1 will study the relationship between the Protocol and the Convention. After outlining the relevant provisions of the Convention and the Protocol, Section 2 will identify two types of conflict of norms that seem to arise from the wording of these treaties: one related to the rights protected and the other one related to the jurisdiction of the lAS bodies. Section 3 will try to solve both conflicts by using the tools set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).lS In Section 4 the Court's decision in Acevedo- Buendia et al. v. Peru will be analysed taking into consideration how the conflicts were solved in the previous section. Finally, Section 5 will conclude that the Protocol is an integral part of the !AS that cannot and should not be ignored by the Commission or the Court.
2, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND THE CONVENTION
Supporters of the direct approach argue that the Protocol is an 'entirely separate treaty [whose] Lettres.17 Linderfalk recognises that it is not always easy to determine whether two instruments shall be considered as integral parts of a single treaty, or whether they shall be considered as two separate treaties. In the agreement between Yugoslavia and Romania cited above it was easy to determine that all those instruments shall be considered a single treaty, because there is a provision that expressly states that. However, two international instruments are not necessarily to be considered as two separate treaties, just because it is not stated that they are to be considered as an integrated whole. 'The ultimate determining factors for the relationship between two instruments are the intentions of their parties'. 18 Even though the Protocol of San Salvador does not contain a specific provision saying that it is an integral part of the Convention, that conclusion could be reached by its name and preamble.l9 The Protocol is not just another treaty in the lAS; it is an 'Additional Protocol to the American Convention', adopted only by the State Parties to the Convention. It also makes direct reference to Article 77(1) ACHR which allows State Parties to submit proposed protocols to the Convention. 20 This relationship was the understanding of the Court when it submitted to the OAS its observations on the Draft Protocol. According to the Court, if the idea was to include other rights in the protection regime of the Convention, it would need to be done through the adoption of an additional protocol and not through a separate convention.2I 
Idem.
Gautier indicates that the title given to an instrument may in some cases clarify its nature, 'as an element, among others, indicating the intention of its authors' (Gautier, P., 'Article 2: Use of Terms', in: Corten, 0. 
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In the European system of human rights, the European Convention of Human Rights and its Protocols have been read as a whole.
22 This amounts to say that 'the European Convention and its protocols are to be considered as together forming the text of one single treaty'.''The very same conclusion could be applied in the lAS. The intention of the State Parties to the Convention was to adopt another instrumentthe Protocol -for the purpose of incorporating other rights and freedoms into the protective system of the Convention and to enhance that system of protection. Accordingly, when appliers, pursuant to Article 31 VCLT, interpret an ESC right provision, they must follow the general rule of interpretation embodied in Article 31 VCLT, which provides that '[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'. The first step, therefore, is to analyse the ordinary meaning of the relevant provision. If the ordinary meaning is either vague or ambiguous or leads to conflicting results, it must then be supplemented by additional means of interpretation, such as the context. Pursuant to Article 31(2) VCLT, the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, inter alia, the 'text, including its preamble and annexes'. The 'text' of a treaty, pursuant to Article 2(1)(a) VCLT, consists of any and all instruments of which the treaty can be considered comprised. In the !AS the relevant 'text' on ESC rights is comprised not only by the American Convention, but also the Protocol of San Salvador. The Protocol is an integral part of the Convention and must be read together with it. The next section will further address this relationship.
3.
THE The State Parties shall transmit to the Commission a copy of each of the reports and studies that they submit annually to the Executive Committees of the InterAmerican Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture, in their respective fields, so that the Commission may watch over the promotion of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires.
The term 'watch over' is not defined in Article 42 ACHR, but Article 41 ACHR includes a number of functions and powers of the Commission, including taking action on petitions and other communications. 25 Article 41 ACHR makes no distinction between the rights contained in Part I, Chapter II of the Convention ('Civil and Political Rights'), and the ones implicit in Article 26 ACHR, the lonely provision in Chapter III ('Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights') . No distinction could be found either in other provisions that describe the procedure to be followed in individual petitions or define the jurisdiction of the Commission and the Court. 26 These norms 26 
166
Art. 41 ACHR provides: 'The main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense of human rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and powers: a. to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America; b. to make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to further the observance of those rights; c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance of its duties; d. to request the governments of the member states to supply it with information on the measures adopted by them in matters ofhuman rights; e. to respond, through the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, to inquiries made by the member states on matters related to human rights and, within the limits of its possibilities, to provide those states with the advisory services they request; f. to take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority under the provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention; and g. to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.' Art. 44 ACHR allows the lodging of petitions with the Commission 'containing denunciations or complaints of violation ofthis Convention by a State Party'; Article 45 ACHR stipulates that a State Party may submit communications alleging that another State Party 'has committed a violation of a human right set forth in this Convention'; Art. 47(b) ACHR mandates the Commission to consider inadmissible any petition or communication submitted if it 'does not state facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by this Convention'; Art. 48(l)(f) ACHR provides that when the Commission receives a petition or communication alleging violation of 'any of the rights protected by this Convention', it shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to 'reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in this Convention'; Art. 63(1) ACHR provides that if the Court 'finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated'; finally Art. 62(1) ACHR If the Protocol was adopted in order to include other rights and freedoms, then the rights and freedoms included by the PSS were not recognised in the Convention and they were not 'within its system of protection'. If those rights and freedoms were already in the Convention, the States Parties would have preferred to amend the Convention to complement or expand the scope of such rights. 28 The sole idea of a 'protocol', pursuant to Article 77 ACHR, means inclusion. On the contrary, the ordinary meaning of the term 'amendment' denotes the improvement or revision of a text. Therefore, the literal reading of these norms may lead to the following conclusion: The relevant section of the Preamble of the Protocol reads as follows: 'Considering that the American Convention on• Human Rights provides that draft additional protocols to that Convention may be submitted for consideration to the States Parties, meeting together on the occasion of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, for the purpose of gradually incorporating other rights and freedoms into the protective system thereof, Have agreed upon the following Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights "Protocol of San Salvador"'. It is important to emphasise that Conclusions A and C are related to the rights protected, while Conclusions B and D are related to the ratione materiae jurisdiction of the lAS bodies. This article will refer to the first conflict as <rights-based conflict', and the second one as 'jurisdiction-based conflict'. In the next section this article will offer some solutions to both conflicts.
SOLVING THE CONFLICTS
The first step to solve conflicts between norms is verifying whether the treaties have a conflict-resolving clause. A right which is recognized or in effect in a State by virtue of its internal legislation or international conventions may not be restricted or curtailed on the pretext that this Protocol does not recognize the right or recognizes it to a lesser degree.
Pursuant to Art. 30(2) VCLT 'When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail'. See also Sadat-Akhavi, S.A., Methods of Resolving Conflicts Between Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston, 2003.
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The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador I 1hese two norms, however, are not applicable to both conflicts analysed here. Article 4 PSS assumes that a right must be recognised in other international conventions and this is precisely the fact that is in dispute in the 'rights-based conflict': whether or not the Protocol is including rights that were not in the Convention. On the other hand, Article 4 PSS indicates that a 'right' may not be restricted, but it does not grant jurisdiction to the Commission or the Court to declare a violation of the provision that recognises that right. Similarly, Article 4 PSS cannot be interpreted as if it is prohibiting the use of Article 19(6) PSS 'as a pretext to limit or restrict the adjudicability of the rights consecrated in Convention Article 26' 30 Accepting that Article 4 PSS 'cancels' the purpose of Article 19(6) PSS would mean that the States had two contradictory aims when they adopted the Protocol: (i) not to limit the jurisdiction of the lAS bodies (Article 4 PSS), and (ii) to limit the jurisdiction of the lAS bodies (Article 19(6) PSS). This is a false conflict, since another interpretation, more natural and :fitted to the ordinary meaning of the terms is possible. Article 4 PSS commands that a right or its scope cannot be limited on the pretext of the Protocol, but it is silent in respect to the jurisdiction of the lAS bodies. The specific provision or lex specialis that expressly deals with jurisdictional issues is Article 19 PSS, which in its paragraph 6 limits the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the Commission and the Court.
This conclusion cannot be overthrown by the pro homineprinciple or the principle of the most favourable rule for protection of human rights, that has been developed under Article 29 ACHR, 31 according to which the Court must turn to the broader standard or more extensive interpretation when it comes to recognise the rights protected and, inversely, to the narrow standard or interpretation when it comes to set restrictions, limitations, or suspensions of the exercise of rights. 32 The Court has rightly concluded that the pro homine principle cannot be used as a basis for granting jurisdiction when the literal meaning of a norm does not. 33 In the case Gonzdlez et al. v. Mexico, the applicants requested the Court to declare a violation of Art. 9 of the Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, "Convention ofBelCm do Pan'i" (9 June 1994, 33ILM 1534), despite the fact that Art. 12 only grants jurisdiction to the lAS bodies to declare a violation of Art. 7 of this Convention. According to the applicants, the Court had jurisdiction, 'taking into account the "direct relationship" of Article 9 with Article 7 of that Convention, based on a "pro personae interpretation" of Article 12 and on the principle of effectiveness'. The Court ruled that 'the systematic and teleological criteria are insufficient to give them preference over what is clearly indicated by the literal meaning of Article 12 of the Convention of BelCm do Pari, which establishes that the petition system shall I Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chidboga treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary me'anini to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its and purpose'. It is evident from reading this text that the object and purpose is considered independently of other means of interpretation. The object and ourn,,o.
is always used in relation to 'the ordinary meaning'; it is always a second step in interpretation process. According to Linderfalk, what Article 31(1) VCLT says is not that the terms of a treaty shall be interpreted in the light of its object purpose. What the provision says is that a treaty shall be interpreted «in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty [ ... ] in the light of its object and purpose". 34
If the ordinary meaning of a provision is clear in not granting jurisdiction to the lAS bodies, the object and purpose of the Convention cannot be used to overthrown that result. Consequently, there is no conflict-resolving clause in the Convention or in the Protocol that could be applied to both conflicts we are analysing here. The interpreter must therefore turn to other tools offered in the VCLT to solve the conflicts.
RIGHTS-BASED CONFLICT: WHETHER THE PROTOCOL IS INCLUDING RIGHTS THAT THE CONVENTION DOES NOT PROTECT
As seen above, Article 26 ACHR does not recognise directly any right; it makes a referral to the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the OAS Charter. Supporters of the direct approach have inferred virtually all internationally recognised ESC rights through different interpretations of the Charter's provisions. The wording of the Charter is so broad that its interpreters have read in it whatever they have wanted to read. For instance, the right to health has been inferred from Article 34(i) of the Charter, which declares that one of the goals of the OAS Member States is the 'protection of man's potential through the extension and application of modern medical science'. Since the 'medical science' is related to the right to health, this has been enough to infer this right from the Charter to 'fill' Article 26 ACHR. 35 38 The text of the treaty is the base but also the limit to its interpreters' activity. If the process of interpretation has followed the applicable ;nternational rules and its results could still be attributed to the text, there would be a it includes a new norm, there would e an extreme non-mterpre a ton. Thus, it is not enough just to infer a right by its name from the Charter, it is also necessary that the Charter provides a minimum content for that right. This minimum content could then be clarified-to a certain extent-by other international 36 Abramovich, and Rossi, loc.cit. note 8, at p. 37 (author's translation; the original in Span~sh re~~s: 'un catalogo complete de derechos sociales que evidentemente los Estados no tuvieron mtennon de incorporar en el sistema de la Convenci6n, diseiiado principalmente para la tutela de derechos civiles y poHticos').
. give full content to the ESC rights inferred to fill Article 26 ACHR, disregarding at the time the provisions that are not 'useful', would mean treating the Protocol as if it were a menu, where the interpreter/diner chooses the provision/dish that better fits his or her interests. It would also mean that there are two rights to food, two rights to health, two rights to work, and so on, arising from the same source -the Protocol -but with different protection mechanisms. In the following section, this article will discuss in depth the jurisdictional issues, but for now it can be stressed that this kind of interpretation would undermine the IAS cohesion.
Summarising, Article 26 ACHR makes a referral to the OAS Charter and the Charter alone. Interpreters should not avoid this step by appealing to other international instruments, including the American Declaration. Interpretation is a tool for clarifying norms rather than altering norms; therefore, it is not enough to infer just the name of an ESC right from the Charter, it is also necessary that the Charter provides some content to that right. Such minimum content could then be clarified -to a certain extent -using other international instruments, including the Declaration. Giving full content to an ESC right using instruments different from the Charter would imply a modification of the Charter, and depending on the case, it would also enforce global covenants locally, harden global soft-law, circumvent the will of OAS Member States, and undermine the cohesion of the lAS.
It can be argued that some civil and political rights are also so vaguely defined to the extent that the !AS bodies had had to 'fill' the right almost. completely by using other international treaties. That is the case, for instance, of the rights of the child. Article 19 ACHR provides that '[e]very minor child has the right to the measures of protectiori required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state'. The Court has borrowed global and European standards as a means of I o,waldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga providing specificity to this right. 46 However, this position has been criticised in the following terms:
The rapid incorporation of blocks of global hard and soft law into the regional convention spares the Court considerable effort in working out and justifying the consequences of Article 19, and demands major improvements in the conditions suffered by impoverished children in the Americas. In part. this advance may be supported on the ground that all parties to the American Convention have also ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, that consensual argument would not extend further to the incorporation of non-binding elaborations of CRC provisions or to other soft law instruments concerning children. The formulations contained in soft law might turn out to coincide with the most convincing suprapositive analysis of children's human rights, but the bare appearance of a proposition in a UN resolution or an expert body's recommendation does not ipso facto carry conclusive normative force.47 Therefore, the conclusion should not be that ESC rights must be 'filled' entirely by standards borrowed from European or global treaties or soft-law, just like some civil and political rights have been. Quite the opposite, the Court should be very careful when it borrows foreign standards to provide specificity to any right, but especially ESC rights that are not expressly defined in the Convention, or even worse, not defined in the Charter.
It is not the purpose of this piece to discover which ESC rights could be inferred from the Charter, but the ordinary reading of Article 26 ACHR clearly indicates that it contains 'rights'. What then is the Protocol including? The only logical conclusion that can be derived from both, the Convention and the Protocol, is that the latter is (1) including rights that cannot be inferred from the Charter, whether because they can only be inferred by their name but with no content, or cannot be inferred at all, and (2) giving a broader content to the rights that can be inferred from the Charter. If this position is correct, the rights-based conflict is not a conflict at all. The Protocol is in fact including-pursuant to Article 77 ACHR-some rights that previously were not in the Convention, but it is also complementing and expanding the rights that previously could be inferred to fill in Article 26 ACHR. As a result, Conclusions A and C mentioned above are not excluding; they can be read together: Article 26 ACHR, as far as it refers to the Charter, contains some rights that were expanded by the Protocol, which at the same time included other rights that were not protected by Article 26 ACHR. 
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The aforementioned position is supported by the Commission's reports submitted to the OAS General Assembly" and by the Commission's submission of the Draft ProtocoL49 The Commission used a series of guidelines to determine the ESC rights to be included in the Protocol, as well as the institutional mechanisms to be established. In its annual report 1983-1984 it asserted: the rights incorporated into the Charter are considered in the context of the standards of international law applicable to relations among the American states, for which reason they do not constitute a base of standards that makes possible their international protection. In other words, that instrument does not recognize human rights, compliance with which may be claimed agaiust a state, but rather it establishes objectives of economic and social development to be reached by the states through internal effort and international cooperation. Therefore, they cannot be treated jointly with the purely instrumental elements such as improvement of the administrative apparatus of the state, international trade, economic integration, tax reforms, and so forth. The list of those rights, moreover, is incomplete.
50
'Jbe Commission also noted that the draft Protocol contained three sets of ESC rights: (1) rights that 'should merely be reaffirmed in the Additional Protocol', since they were 'adequately covered' in other instruments, either universal or regional, including the OAS Charter; (2) other internationally recognized rights that 'should be elaborated and developed'; and (3) rights that were based solely on national legislations.
51
The Commission did not state what ESC rights were in each of the three categories mentioned above, but it is clear that the Protocol was intended to include, elaborate and develop the ESC rights contained in the Charter -and by inference in Article 26 ACHR. Hence, it is not possible to say, as some commenters do, that all of the rights protected in the Protocol are likewise protected by Article 26 ACHR. 52 Lastly, one question remains: is it possible that the Protocol is not including some rights contained in the Charter? So far this article has explained that not all the rights included by the Protocol were previously recognised in the Charter -and therefore in Article 26 ACHR -or were recognised in a lesser extent. That is to say that the right X was recognised in the Charter, and the Protocol elaborated or developed it, and the right y was not recognised in the Charter, but it was included by the ProtocoL Yet, there [1985] [1986] the Commission submitted the draft to the General Assembly (see, IAComHR, Annual Report 1985 -1986 ne,,ntto be followed to avoid all the mentioned inconveniences and to reach the necessary to strengthen the system of protection. Fortunately, the Commission itb.e p•os:;ibilityto submit proposed amendments to include the recognition of other or freedoms in the Protocol. Perhaps the efforts of civil society should focus in au 1 esting the Commission to make use of this prerogative rather than requesting it irledare a violation of Article 26 ACHR in individual petitions.
In conclusion, for the States that have ratified the Protocol, inferences to fill in 26 ACHR are no longer needed. The rights they decided to provide through i"reatvcJe"vel protection are those listed in the Protocol, with the scope they agreed rights to have. For the States that have not ratified the ProtocoL inferences to in Article 26 ACHR can still take place, but they cannot go beyond the rights <te•cog:nH;eo in the Protocol. It will be absurd if a State that did not ratify the Protocol obliged to protect more rights than a State that did ratify it. As the former President the Inter-American Court, judge Cant;ado Trindade sums up, Article 26 ACHR is regrettable historical anachronism, a provision of bad design and formulation, the result of ideological antagonism at the time of its sluggish writing. 
JURISDICTION-BASED CONFLICT: WHETHER THE COMMISSION AND THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION

RATIONEMATERIAE
The second conflict of norms is related to the jurisdiction of the lAS bodies. I Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chiriboga ~f the Convention and the Protocol in this respect must be to discover what the States Intended when they adopted such instruments.
Ventura-Rob!es 58 and Mejia-Rivera 59 affirmed that two of the three drafts of the Amencan ConventiOn (the ones presented by the Inter-American Council nfr,__._, and by the Uruguay) did not conceive of ESC rights as directly enforceable before the Commission and the Court. The remaining draft (the one presented by Chile) extended to ahmit:d number of ESC rights (property rights, the right to social security, the nght to umomse, and some educational rights) the application of the civil and political rights' contentious proceedings before the Commission and Court. In short not even the most progressive draft envisaged all ESC rights as fully enforceable, and that draft was not even accepted by the other States.
The travaux preparatoires also shows that Article 26 ACHR and Article 42 ACHR were once together. Article 42 ACHR used to be Article 27 of the Draft American Convention and it used to have the title 'Control of Compliance with the Obi' · '60Th 1gat10ns.
e purpose of draft Article 27 was to verify if the State Parties were fulfilling their obligations under Article 26. The mechanism chosen to that effect was the submission of periodic reports and not the system of individual petitions. 61 Draft Article 27 was relocated to become the current Article 42 ACHR, because it deals with functions and powers of the Commission. This article now has no title, and it is in Section 2 'Functions' of Chapter VII, devoted to the Commission. However, the connection between Article 26 ACHR and Article 42 ACHR is undeniable since they make the same referral to the OAS Charter. It seems then that Article 42 ACHR was the mechanism chosen by the OAS Member States to monitor the fulfilment of the ESC rights implicit in Article 26 ACHR, and not the system of individual petitions.
LeBlanc's analysis of the travaux pn!paratoires affirms that draft Article 27 (current Article 42 ACHR) was criticised by several States and 'seemed to be strongly supported by none'. 62 In his view, this Article was more controversial than Article 26 ACHR. He asserts that the criticisms focused on two issues. First, some questions were raised about the usefulness of the reporting mechanism, because the OAS Member States were already reporting on ESC matters to other OAS bodies. The second criticism questioned whether or not the Commission was the competent body to supervise the implementation of ESC rights. '[t] he failure to provide specific protection for these nghts appear,' to be n~!:n oversight, but rather a conscious effort to weaken state obl~gatmns m th1s respect.
The aim of excluding the Commission succeeded m the years that followed h doption of the American Convention. In its annual report 1983-1984, the t e a ' b' d 'th Commission recognised that the Jack of precision of Article 26 ACHR com me WI the undeniable difficulty involved in the consideration of economic, social, and cult~ral rights, have brought about the inoperability, in practice, of Article 42 of the Amencan Convention'66 It also noted that the solution adopted by the OAS Member States to the protection of ESC rights, which is reflected in Article 42 ACHR, 'has, in practice, meant postponing the treatment of this matter'. 67 A few years later, the Commission cognised that the mechanism of protection of ESC rights in the lAS was the one ::tablished in Article 42 ACHR, which was inadequate and had not been applicable in the years in which the Convention had been in force.
68 The_ ~ommiss~~n never suggested that ESC rights could be protected by the system of individual petitions: Even some academic papers published before the ConventiOn entered mto force stated that it was unlikely that the Commission could or would interpret Article 41(b) ACHR _ which allows it to make recommendations to the States -as authorising it to make very specific recommendations in this field. A Sta:e Party to.the Convention 'could in such an event cite the language of Article 42, whiCh authonzes the [C]ommission only to watch over the promotion of these rights' 69 If such an interpretation of Article 41(b) was considered problematic,. even more problematiC is interpreting Article 41(f) _ which authorises the CommlSSI_on to take actmn on individual petitions -as applicable instead of Article 42 ACHR. 
The solution that the Commission recommended to the OAS General As:sernhlv overcome the inoperability of Article 42 ACHR and other ESC rights-related was, inter alia) the designation of an institution responsible for the protection promotion of ESC rights by the adoption of a new treaty that establishes the tu 11 ctiior and methods of control to be used by the aforementioned institution. This new had to face the dilemma of 'having an international instrument that is from a legal point of view but lacking in force for want of ratifications, or pn,pa 1 ril a Protocol that will be acceptable to the states in its legal pronouncements but lack practical effectiveness'. 70 The Commission considered that the institution should be in charge of the protection and promotion of ESC rights had to be Commission itself, and the dilemma should be faced by keeping the system mrcep<)f but also granting individuals direct access to the Commission in the case A,,, __ ._ • ESC rights. 71 The Commission was starting from the basis that ESC rights were sheltered by the system of individual petitions, which was reserved only for civil political rights. What the Commission was looking for is that certain ESC could be also covered by the system of individual petitions, whereas the rernainir rights continued to be protected by the system of periodic reportsn
In its annual report [1985] [1986] , the Commission considered that the m:;tltutioni means for the protection and promotion of ESC rights was a 'delicate matter', potential difficulties that such matter could pose could be overcome by a '""''"'"· flexible and effective system'. 73 Such a system was described in Article 21 of the Protocol, where three rights (trade union rights, the right to strike, and of education) enjoyed the same system of protection that was established and political rights. The other ESC rights were protected only by the mechanism periodic reports. 74 The position of the Court was very similar. In its annual report 1985, the presented its observations to the Draft Protocol. It considered that: The Commission stated: 'For some rights, the existing civil and political rights system be applicable. That would be the case when a violation occurred because of direct the government, that is when the violation might be imputed directly and immediately to government, and changing the situation would depend on it. The nature of other economic, and cultural rights would require as a control mechanism the use of periodic and obligatoqmlJort submitted by these countries to the agency responsible for protecting and promoting mc»engu so that they could be taken into consideration by that agency when it issued its opinion matter. This system is appropriate for those rights whose full effectiveness takes time make it possible to evaluate the progress achieved. Specific results would therefore be ev;alu;ated relation to economic, social and cultural rights, thus avoiding having the institution '"Por"iblf for their protection and promotion making determinations about development policies and themselves ' (IAComHR, op.cit. note 48) . IAComHR, op.cit. note 49.
Idem.
The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador I the so called economic, social and cultural rights, there are also some icaJrno'nagct or can act as subjective rights jurisdictionally enforceable, bu~ there are that, without ceasing to be fundamental rights of the human bemg, are by nature or by each country's conditions of economic and social developmen:, on the establishment of a complex institutional and economiC ;;stJructur·e, for which reason it would not be reasonable in the present state of the of development of the peoples of the Americas to recognize that those be immediately and fully enforceable per se [ ... ] .
those rights to which the specific system of protection established by the Arner·ica.n Convention is applicable should be incorporated into the mechanisms arJd ]prc>cedures provided for by the Convention through an Additional Protocol.
to say, those rights that may become jurisdictionally enforceable, ~s annual report 1986, the Court reiterated its conclusions submitted in its previous but it included the right to strike in the list of enforceable rights 76 In short, Court only three ESC rights (the right of parents to choose the education of children, the right to trade union freedom, and the right to strike) were to be lforceab]le thr<JU[~b the system ofindividual petitions, the other ESC nghts were only system of periodic reports and through the advisory JUnsdiCtion Court, and not through its contentious jurisdiction. The position of the Court I>Vi•om:l~ started by considering the rights contained in Articl~ 26 ACHR as nonifo1:ce;1ble directly through the system of individual petitions.
The Protocol of San Salvador was approved almost in the same terms proposed Commission.'? The States, however, considered that the right to strike should covered by the system of individual petitions. They also included more details on how the system of periodic reports should work. The discussions of the States therefore, started from the fact that ESC rights were not enforceable directly, and tha; the system of reports stipulated in Article 42 ACHR had to be improved. As Cavallaro and Schaffer rightly pointed out, 'the background understanding of the drafters regarding ESC rights and the American Convention was that those rights could not be litigated through article 26 of the Convention'.78 Taking the above considerations into account, the jurisdiction-based conflict is not a real conflict either. The American Convention was never intended to protect ESC rights by the system of individual petitions. The mechanism chosen by the States was the system of periodic reports enshrined in Article 42 ACHR. This mechanism is not an additional protection to ESC rights, as some commenters suggest;79 it is the only mechanism provided by the Convention. Article 41 ACHR is not applicable to ESC rights. Otherwise, why would the States decide to incorporate a specific provision related to ESC rights (Art. 42 ACHR) when the Commission's faculties and competence were already defined in Article 41 ACHR? The only logical answer is that Article 42 ACHR is lex specialis regarding ESC rights protection. The Protocol of San Salvador came to improve that mechanism, which was ineffective in practice, and also granted direct enforceability to two ESC rights (the right to unionisation and the right to education).
This solution is the one that best gives effect to both treaties, the Convention and the Protocol; best respects the consent of the Inter-American States; and best adheres to the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of both treaties in their context. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IN ACEVEDO-BUEND!A ET AL. VPERU
Intersentia
The Amecican Convention and the Pwtocol of San Salvador I the Court to also declare that the State was responsible for the violation of the right to social security protected, in their view, by Article 26 ACHR. Peru objected to the jurisdiction ratione materiae pointing out that the Court lacked competence in matters concerning the alleged violation to the right to social security, since such a right is not included in the American Convention and it is not even one of the two rights that would be actionable before the lAS in accordance with Article 19(6) of the protocol.
The Court asserted that the broad wording of the Convention indicates that according to Article 62(1) ACHR, it has 'full jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to its articles and provisions'. 81 Since Peru is a State Party to the Convention and has acknowledged the adversarial jurisdiction of the Court, the latter was 'competent to decide whether the State has failed to complywith or violated any of the rights enshrined in the Convention, even the aspect concerning article 26 thereof'. 82 The Court noted that the violation of the Protocol 'has not been alleged in the case at hand',' 3 and therefore it considered it 'unnecessary' to decide whether it has jurisdiction over said treaty.
•• It rejected the preliminary objection raised by the State.
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On the merits, the Court ruled that Peru violated the rights of the workers to judicial protection (Article 25 ACHR) and to property (Article 21 ACHR), but it did not find grounds 'to additionally declare the non-compliance with Article 26 of said treaty'.86 However, it made an historical and systematic interpretation of this provision. 87 According to the historical interpretation, the Tribunal noted that the content of Article 26 ACHR was: 81 84 85 86 the subject-matter of an intense debate in the preparatory works of the Convention, as a result of the States Parties' interest to assign a 'direct reference' to economic, social and cultural 'rights'; 'a provision establishing certain legal mandatory nature [ ... ] in its compliance and application' as well as 'the [respective] mechanisms [for its] promotion and protection', since the Preliminary Draft of the treaty prepared by the Inter-American Commission made reference to such mechanisms in two Articles that, according to some of the States, only 'contemplated, in a merely declarative text, the conclusions reached in the Buenos Aires Conference'. The review of said preparatory works of the Convention also proves that the main observations, upon which the approval of the Convention was based, placed a special emPhasis on 'granting the economic, social and cultural rights the maximum prote:tion compatible I Oswaldo R. Ruiz-Chi>iboga with the peculiar conditions to most of the American States'. In this way, as part of the debate in the preparatory works, it was also proposed 'to materialize the exercise of [said rights] by means of the activity of the courts '. 88 Regarding the systematic interpretation, the Court noted: even though Article 26 is embodied in chapter III of the Convention, entitled 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', it is also positioned in Part I of said instrument, entitled 'State Obligations and Rights Protected' and, therefore, is subject to the general obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 mentioned in chapter I (entitled 'General Obligations'), as well as Articles 3 to 25 mentioned in chapter II (entitled 'Civil and Political Rights') 8 '
The explanation of the Court is insufficient and even misleading. First, the Court made no effort to clarify whether the right to social security is one of the rights implicit in the Charter that can be inferred to fill in Article 26 ACHR. It only mentioned that the commitment requested from the States by this provision consisted in the adoption of measures 'with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of certain economic, social and cultural rights' 90 Which are those rights, or at least why the right to social security is one of those rights, are questions that the Court did not answer.
Second, the historic interpretation of the Court is incomplete. The Court put forward the points of view of only those States which tried to materialise the exercise of ESC rights by means of the activity of the Court. No mention was made of the countries which opposed the enforceability of ESC rights and, more importantly, as Burgorgue-Larsen recalls:
nothing was said about the process which ultimately gave rise to the drafting of Article 26 as such. Nor was anything said about the scope the different States were prepared to confer on this article. Does this mean that the article was the result of a compromise, or did it represent those States which were in favour of giving economic and social rights such an important place? Clearly, the silences of the Court were part of its strategy to reach its objective, come what may, namely conferring the widest scope possible on Article 26. But Brazil and Guatemala aside, the preparatory works show just how reluctant the majority of States were to recognize that what was to become Article 26 should be actionable 91 Third, the systemic interpretation of the Court is also incomplete. 
Intersentia
The Amedcan Convention and the Pwtocol of San Salvadm I 'State Obligations and Rights Protected', but it did not study other provisions of the Convention, such as Article 42 ACHR, which as explained earlier, may lead to the conclusion that the mechanism chosen by the States to protect ESC rights was the system of periodic reports and not the system of individual petitions. Moreover, the Court completely ignored the Protocol. As seen above, the Protocol is a fundamental piece of the agreement of the States. How can the Court interpret what the intention of the State Parties was if it ignores a fundamental expression of such intention?
The Court explained that it was not going to analyse the Protocol because the Commission and the representatives of the victims did not base their arguments on it. The fact that the applicants did not make any allegation based on the Protocol is understandable because the Protocol would have undermined their position, since the right to social security is not an enforceable right according to Article 19(6) PSS. The strategy they used is the one recommended by the supporters of the direct approach:
while litigants should never plead direct violations of the Protocol's substantive norms outside articles S.l.a and 13, they can use the Protocol's extensive catalogue of social rights as interpretive tools when invoking the broadly overlapping, but more vaguely-defined rights subject to the Commission and Court's contentious jurisdiction through Convention article 26. 92 However, Peru brought the Protocol into play in its submissions. As a matter of fact, the government's defence was strongly based on the Protocol. But the Court remained silent, and the silence of the Court on this matter simply belies the judgment and its conclusions.
There are pending cases before the Court at this moment where new allegations on the direct enforceability of Article 26 ACHR have been made. It is hoped the Court will refine its arguments regarding its jurisdiction, or better yet, reconsiders its previous judgment in Acevedo-Buendia et al. by reading the Protocol and the Convention as they really are: two intertwined treaties.
CONCLUSIONS
The American Convention and the Protocol of San Salvador are to be considered as together forming the text of one single treaty. The Protocol should not be ignored because it is a fundamental expression of the consent of the State Parties. For the ~tate Parties, it is no longer necessary to discover which are the ESC rights implicit in the OAS Charter in order to include them in Article 26 ACHR. The States made it clear that the rights they are willing to protect are the ones listed in the Protocol. The States also made the scope of such rights clear. Including more For the States that are parties in the Convention but not the Protocol, it is still necessary to discover which rights are implicit in the OAS Charter in order to include them in Article 26 ACHR .. However, the process of 'extraction' of such rights from the Charter is limited by the following considerations. First, Article 26 ACHR makes a referral to the OAS Charter and the Charter alone. Interpreters should not avoid this step by appealing to other international instruments, including the American Declaration. Second, due to the fact that interpretation is a tool for clarifying norms rather than altering norms, it is not enough to infer just the name of an ESC right from the Charter. It is also necessary that the Charter provides some content to that right. Third, if the Charter provides minimum content, it could then be clarified -to a certain extent -using other international instruments, including the Declaration.
And, finally, if the Charter does not provide minimum content, the relevant right cannot be included in Article 26 ACHR. Giving full content to an ESC right using instruments different from the Charter would signify a modification of the Charter and, depending on the case, would also enforce global covenants locally, harden global soft-law, circumvent the will of the States and undermine the cohesion of the IAS.
The applicable mechanism to monitor the compliance of the State Parties to the Convention of their ESC rights-related obligations is the system of periodic reports set out in Article 42 ACHR. This provision is not a supplement or an addition to Article 41 ACHR. It is the only mechanism regarding the ESC rights implicit in Article 26 ACHR.
Article 42 ACHR is not applicable to the States that have ratified the Protocol. Instead Article 19 PSS is applicable. The latter provision improved the mechanism of periodic reports and granted jurisdiction ratione materiae to the Commission and the Court regarding individual petitions in cases of alleged violations of the rights to unionisation and education. The Court's judgment in the case Acevedo-Buendia et al. v. Peru is far from being conclusive. The Court's reasoning in this case was incomplete, mainly because it totally ignored the Protocol, but also because it did not consider all the relevant provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, its analysis of the preparatory works only focused on the States that supported the enforceability of ESC rights. This is a single judgment that by no means could be considered jurisprudence constante. The Court should clarify, or better yet modify, its previous judgment in the next case in which it is requested to rule on Article 26 ACHR.
